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Recognizing the speech acts in our interlocutors’ utterances is 
a crucial prerequisite for conversation. However, it is not a 
trivial task given that the form and content of utterances is 
frequently underspecified for this level of meaning. In the 
present study we investigate participants’ competence in 
categorizing speech acts in such action-underspecific 
sentences and explore the time-course of speech act 
inferencing using a self-paced reading paradigm. The results 
demonstrate that participants are able to categorize the speech 
acts with very high accuracy, based on limited context and 
without any prosodic information. Furthermore, the results 
show that the exact same sentence is processed differently 
depending on the speech act it performs, with reading times 
starting to differ already at the first word. These results 
indicate that participants are very good at “getting” the speech 
acts, opening up a new arena for experimental research on 
action recognition in conversation. 
Keywords: Action; Speech acts; Implicature; Pre-Offers; 
Conversation Analysis; Self-paced reading.  
Introduction 
Knowing a language doesn’t just require syntax or 
semantics, but the ability to extract speech acts from our 
interlocutors’ utterances. This is crucial in conversation, 
since all actions – be they non-verbal or verbal – have 
implications for how we should respond (Schegloff, 2007): 
A greeting calls for another greeting, an offer is followed by 
an acceptance or declination. Scholars in Conversation 
Analysis were the first to reveal the systematicity of courses 
of action in turn-taking (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
1974; Schegloff, 2007), moving away from the single act as 
the fundamental unit of analysis – the perspective of Speech 
Act theory (Austin, 1976; Searle, 1969) – to the role of 
sequential context. One of the main observations from this 
literature is that turns tend to come in pairs of actions and in 
such adjacency pairs the first (pair) part sets up powerful 
constraints on what type of action can follow (Schegloff, 
2007). Moreover, not all actions have equal status. 
Reflecting an orientation towards preference structure, 
dispreferred actions, such as rejections to invitations, tend to 
be delivered with inter-turn gaps, turn-initial delay, hedges 
or other discourse markers (uhm, well) (Schegloff, 2007), 
while preferred actions (e.g. acceptances) do not. This 
suggests that conversationalists not only monitor speech for 
actions but also orient to sequential constraints. 
Given that action is the sine qua non of conversation, how 
do we map speech acts onto our interlocutors‘ utterances, 
bridging the gap between sentence meaning and action? In 
some cases this is a simple matter. In the utterance Please 
close the door, for instance, the imperative mood and the 
adverb please function as “special markers” or 
“illocutionary force indicating devices” (Levinson, 1983;  
Clark, 1979; Schegloff, 2007) that clearly indicate this is a 
request. In most utterances, however, the absence of such 
dedicated vocabulary leaves the propositional content 
underspecified for the speech act level of meaning. As an 
example, an assertion like I have a credit card can deliver 
different speech acts, depending on context. When 
responding to a question from our interlocutor (e.g. How are 
you going to pay for the ticket?), I have a credit card 
functions as an information-giving answer. If it follows an 
offer of payment (e.g. I can lend you money for the ticket), it 
is used to indirectly decline it. In this case it could be 
characterized as an indirect speech act, in which “one 
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of 
performing another” (Searle, 1975). In yet another 
interchange, if our interlocutor has expressed the need or 
desire for some means of payment (e.g. I don’t have any 
money to pay for the ticket), the same statement of 
ownership can function as a prelude to an offer, called a 
Pre-Offer in Conversation Analysis (Schegloff, 1988; 
Schegloff, 2007). In all three cases, the form and semantic 
content is underspecified for the action such that the full 
import of the utterance I have a credit card can only be 
ascertained relative to the context, in this case the prior 
speech act in the conversation. 
There is some psychological evidence that people do 
extract speech act information online. Using a recognition 
probe task and lexical decision task, Holtgraves (2008a) 
addressed whether the comprehension of a sentence like 
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Don’t forget to go to your dentist (an “implicit speech act”) 
entails automatic activation of the speech act performed 
(reminding). He found that the recognition of such speech 
acts is automatic, both in written and spoken utterances. A 
further study (Holtgraves, 2008b) suggests that people 
recognize and retain in long-term memory the actions that 
people perform with their utterances. In line with Speech 
Act Theory and Conversation Analysis, Holtgraves (2008a) 
argues that “in conversation there is an action dimension, a 
dimension that does not exist for isolated sentences or texts. 
Speakers are usually constructing utterances with the 
intention to perform certain actions, and with the intention 
of having the recipient recognize those actions” (p. 640). 
Clearly, action recognition crosscuts research on topics 
such as communicative intention and implicature in 
Pragmatics (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983; Sperber & 
Wilson, 2004), the study of indirect speech acts (e.g. Gibbs, 
1979; Clark, 1979; Clark, 1996; Coulson & Lovett, 2010) 
and discourse processing (e.g. Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 
1994) in Psycholinguistics, as well as a more general 
discussion of action and theory of mind in the cognitive 
sciences. There is limited experimental research, however, 
on speech act recognition in spoken dialogue. The 
experimental approach used in Holtgraves (2008a, 2008b) 
involves artificial tasks (lexical decision and recognition 
probe) and does not unravel the time-course of action 
recognition. The puzzle remains: how is it that we can 
extract speech acts from utterances so efficiently, as 
evidenced by extraordinarily fast turn transitions (Sacks et 
al., 1974; Stivers et al., 2009; Levinson, in press)? To 
address this we are currently planning an Event-Related 
Potential (ERP) study on action recognition in auditorily 
presented dialogues to track the time course of action 
comprehension in real time. The experiment presented in 
this paper was designed to assess the feasibility of such a 
study. 
The Experiment 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate 
participants’ competence in identifying speech acts in 
action-underspecific sentences and explore the time-course 
of speech act inferencing. To do this we presented target 
sentences using the self-paced reading paradigm and asked 
participants to categorize the speech acts and rate how sure 
they were in the categorization. In the domain of 
Pragmatics, self-paced reading has been used to investigate 
the processing of phenomena such as scalar implicatures 
(Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006), with longer reading 
times (in comparison to a control) interpreted as indicating 
the generation of an inference. The self-paced reading 
paradigm allows us to obtain information on the word-by-
word processing of action-underspecific utterances, thereby 
exploring the time-course of speech act inferencing.  
The stimuli in our study consist of a context sentence 
which is presented auditorily, followed by a target sentence 
designed to be interpreted as an Answer, Pre-Offer or 
Declination depending on the context (see Table 1). These 
actions are commonly found in conversation and their form 
and function has been described in the conversation analytic 
literature. 
 
Table 1: Examples of stimuli in Dutch and translations. 
 
Condition Context Target Sentence 
Answer Hoe ga je voor het 
ticket betalen? 
How are you going 
to pay for the ticket? 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
I have a credit 
card. 
Declination Ik kan je wat geld 
lenen voor het ticket. 
I can lend you 
money for the ticket. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 
I have a credit 
card. 
Pre-Offer Ik heb geen geld om 
het ticket te betalen. 
I don’t have any 
money to pay for the 
ticket. 
Ik heb een 
creditcard. 




 The Answers in our study complete an adjacency pair by 
responding to a wh-question in the first turn. This condition 
serves as a benchmark for inferencing in the reading time 
analysis since the gap between literal (sentence) meaning 
and the action intended is the smallest. Moreover, since the 
other actions in the study can superficially be viewed as 
Answers, because they respond to the prior turn, this 
condition provides a check on whether participants go 
beyond a simple characterization of the sentences and 
identify the correct speech act. 
The Declinations satisfy an adjacency pair by responding 
to a proposal (an offer or invitation) in the first turn, but 
require a somewhat complex inference to infer the action. 
Conversation analysts have noted that, at least in English, 
such indirect responses “need not be polite, nor unclear or 
obfuscatory. For certain activities, in specific sequential 
locations, responding indirectly may be the most efficient 
form of communication,” (Walker, Drew, & Local, 2011, p. 
17). 
 The third action is the Pre-Offer, which is a type of pre-
sequence. Pre-sequences are preliminary to, or project, the 
main course of action - in this case an offer (Schegloff, 
2007; Schegloff, 1988), demonstrated in the following 
example: 
 
Bookstore, 2.1: 107 (modified from Schegloff, 2007, p. 35) 
1 A:  I’m gonna buy a thermometer though        
because I  
2 B:              but  
3 A:   think she’s got a temperature. 
4 C: Pre-Offer we have a thermometer. 
5 A: Go-ahead yih do? 
6 C: Offer wanta use it? 
7 A: Acceptance yeah. 
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Only if the response to the Pre-Offer is positive (line 5) is 
the offer put forward (line 6). This strategy allows 
conversationalists to check whether an offer would be 
welcome or not, preventing them from embarrassment that 
would arise if an offer were to be rejected. 
Crucially, the Pre-Offers differ from the Answers and 
Declinations in that they do not complete an adjacency pair 
but rather open up or project a continuation of the sequence 
(with the response and possibly a subsequent offer). By 
including Pre-Offers in our study we can not only 
investigate the impact of sequential context on processing, 
but also explore whether the distinction between projection 
(Pre-Offers) and a backward directed inference 
(Declinations) is borne out in reading times. 
Given that the same utterance can be used as an Answer, 
Declination or Pre-offer depending on the sequential 
context, in this study we investigate: 1) Can participants 
reliably categorize action-underspecific speech acts? 2) 
Does the time-course of speech act inferencing differ for 
these actions as reflected in self-paced reading times? Due 
to the exploratory nature of the study and lack of research in 
this area – in particular on Pre-Offers – we do not make 
specific predictions regarding reading times. However, we 
speculate that the reading time pattern of Pre-Offers and 
Declinations may differ relative to Answers, based on the 
structural properties described above.  
 
Methods 
Participants 39 native speakers of Dutch were recruited 
from the student population in Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 
Participants were paid 8 euros for participating. 
 
Materials and Design The stimulus materials were 126 
target sentences, presented visually one word at a time (self-
paced reading), which were preceded by 378 auditory 
context-setting utterances that biased the interpretation of 
the target as an Answer, Pre-offer or Declination. To 
maintain a balance of variety and control in the stimulus 
materials, half of the target sentences started with the 
pronoun “I” (Dutch ik) and the verb “have” (heb), e.g. “I 
have a credit card”. The other half was more varied 
(including simple utterances like “I am going to the market” 
and “My brother is a mechanic”). We varied word-length to 
make the stimuli as natural as possible, but constructed the 
target sentences such that the final word is critical for 
understanding the propositional content of the utterance 
(irrespective of speech act level meaning). In line with 
reported characteristics of indirect replies (Walker et al., 
2011), the target sentences do not involve ellipsis or 
pronominalization.  
To maintain consistency in the way the Declinations and 
Pre-offers are connected to their contexts, we ensured that 
there is at least one clear implicated premise and an 
implicated conclusion for each sentence-pair: when 
presented with an utterance that is indirect, the hearer needs 
to access an implicated premise and combine it with the 
proposition expressed to derive the implicated conclusion 
(Blakemore, 1992).1 
In order to get a measure of the semantic relatedness 
between context and target sentence in each condition, 
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) values (Landauer, Foltz, & 
Laham, 1998) were computed for the English translation of 
each sentence pair using document-to-document mode with 
“General reading up to 1st year of college” as the semantic 
space. The average LSA values for each condition were: 
Answers 0.13, Declinations 0.32, and Pre-Offers 0.42 (the 
higher the value, the more semantic similarity).  
The stimuli were translated from English into Dutch and 
checked by two native speakers of Dutch. The sentences 
were recorded by four native speakers. The recordings of 
the target sentences were not used in this experiment, since 
they are presented visually in self-paced reading.  
The stimuli were pseudo-randomized and balanced across 
three lists, such that participants saw each target sentence 
only once, in one context. After each trial (sentence pair), 
participants were given a comprehension and rating task. 
They were first asked to indicate what the second speaker 
was doing with his response and were given the options of 
Answering, Offering and Declining (D. antwoorden, 
aanbieden, weigeren). Since Pre-Offer is not a colloquial 
term, the broader term of offering was chosen. Participants 
were then asked to rate how sure they were in their 
categorization decision on a rating scale from 1 (very 
uncertain) to 7 (very certain). The purpose of the rating task 
was to assess the feasibility of using the items in future 
studies. 
 
Procedure Participants were given instructions that 
included one example of each action. They were instructed 
to imagine that they were listening to a conversation 
between friends or colleagues, and to read the sentences as 
quickly as possible, but not too quickly as they would have 
to “judge the underlying meaning” of the sentences. They 
were then seated in a chair in front of a monitor in a 
soundproof experimental booth. On each trial the context 
sentence was played while a small picture of a loudspeaker 
was presented at the middle of the screen. 500 msec after 
the end of the spoken sentence participants were presented 
with the target sentence in a moving window self-paced 
reading format (Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982). A series 
of lines appeared on the screen representing each word in 
the target sentence. When participants clicked on the mouse 
the first word appeared and upon subsequent button presses 
a new word was shown, while the previous word was again 
replaced by a line. When participants clicked the mouse 
after the last word had been shown, they were presented 
with the action categorization question, immediately 
followed by the certainty rating. There were 126 
experimental trials, preceded by a brief practice session. 
                                                          
1 In the dialogue (A): I can lend you money for the ticket. – (B): 
I have a credit card, the implicated premise is that a credit card can 
pay for things, including tickets. The implicated conclusion is that 
speaker B does not need A’s help with paying for the ticket. 
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Results 
Accuracy Overall accuracy (number of correct responses in 
the action categorization question divided by the total 
number of responses) was very high, 95.8 percent. Accuracy 
percentages (summarized in Table 2) were very similar 
across conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
that accuracy was not affected by action [F(2, 76) = .07, p = 
.93]. 
 
Table 2: Accuracy and mean certainty ratings. 
 
Certainty Ratings  Accuracy 
Mean SD 
Answer 96.0% 6.60   0.36 
Declination 96.0% 6.50  0.39 
Pre-Offer 95.6% 6.35  0.51 
 
Ratings Participants rated how certain they were in 
answering the action categorization question on a scale from 
1 (very uncertain) to 7 (very certain). The overall mean 
certainty rating was 6.48. Mean certainty ratings for each 
condition are summarized in Table 2. We conducted a 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean ratings and found 
an effect of action [F(1.42, 53.99) = 11.20, p < .01 
(Greenhouse-Geisser)]. Pairwise comparisons using Sidak 
adjustment for multiple comparisons revealed that Pre-
Offers (M=6.35, SD=.51) had lower ratings than Answers 
(M=6.60, SD=.36), [p < .01], and Pre-Offers were also rated 
lower than Declinations (M=6.50, SD=.39), [p < .01]. The 
comparison between Answers and Declinations was not 
significant, [p = .15]. 
 
Reading Times The time between button presses was 
recorded as the reading time for each word. Extreme values 
below 100 msec were excluded, as well as values above 
1200 msec for non-final words and above 7000 msec for 
final words (in total 12 outliers). Since online speech 
comprehension and the subsequent off-line categorization 
task tap different types of information, error trials were not 
excluded from the reading time analysis. 
Mean reading times for the first word, the verb and the 
final word of the target sentences were used for the analysis,   
in addition to the mean reading time of the entire sentence 
and mean reading time per word (sentence reading time 
divided by number of words). A repeated-measures 
ANOVA was carried out to examine the effect of action 
(Answer, Pre-Offer, Declination) on reading times and post-
hoc comparisons were performed using the Sidak 
adjustment.  The conditions started to differ already at the 
first word, with mean reading time being affected by the 
action manipulation [F(1.69, 64.26) = 5.24,  p = .01 
(Greenhouse-Geisser)]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
first word reading times in Pre-Offers (M=259, SD=65) 
were longer than in Answers (M=251, SD=56), [p = .03], 
and Pre-Offers tended to be longer than Declinations 
(M=252, SD=57), [p = .06]. The comparison between 
Answers and Declinations was not significant [p =.98]. 
Table 3: Mean reading times in msec. 
 
At the verb, there was also an effect of action on mean 
reading time [F(2, 76) = 3.41, p = .04]. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that verb RTs in Declinations 
(M=267, SD=69) were longer than in Answers (M=260, 
SD=60), [p = .048]. The comparison between Pre-Offers 
and Answers [p = .25] was not significant, nor between Pre-
Offers and Declinations [p = .80]. 
At the final word, mean reading times also differed 
between actions, [F(1.63, 61.83) = 4.28, p = .03 
(Greenhouse-Geisser)]. Pairwise comparisons on the final 
RTs revealed that Declinations (M=622, SD=447) were 
marginally significantly longer than Answers (M=564, 
SD=384) [p = .052], while there were no differences 
between Answers and Pre-Offers [p = .17], nor Pre-Offers 
and Declinations [p = .41]. 
An ANOVA on mean RTs per word revealed an effect of 
action [F(2, 76) = 5.73, p = .01]. Declinations (M=354, 
SD=146) took longer than Answers (M=339, SD=135) [p = 
.02], and Pre-Offers (M=352, SD=147) took longer than 
Answers (M=339, SD=135), [p = .04]. There was no 
difference between Pre-Offers and Declinations [p = .95].  
Finally, although the RTs for the entire sentence differed 
descriptively, these differences were not reliable [F(2, 76) = 
2.73, p = .09]. 
Discussion 
The present experiment demonstrates that participants 
categorize the speech acts of sentences whose form and 
semantic content is underspecified for action with very high 
accuracy (95.8%). They are able to do so based on limited 
context (the prior speech act) and without any prosodic 
information in the target sentence. Importantly, the accuracy 
was the same for all three actions (Answer, Declination, 
Pre-Offer). If participants had processed the target sentences 
superficially, ignoring the speech act content, they could 
have categorized Declinations and Pre-Offers as Answers. 
                                                          
2 RT of the entire sentence divided by number of words. 
 Answer Declination Pre-Offer 
Mean 
RT 
251 252 259 First 
Word 
SD 56 57 65 
Mean 
RT 
260 267 265 Verb 
SD 60 69 70 
Mean 
RT 
564 622 593 Final 
Word 
SD 384 447 412 
Mean 
RT 
339 354 352 Word2  
SD 135 146 147 
Mean 
RT 
1459 1528 1501 Entire 
Sentence 
SD 584 652 603 
1599
This is the case since the Dutch term for answering 
(antwoorden) also means to respond and all three speech 
acts can superficially be seen as responses. This should have 
resulted in lower accuracy for Pre-Offers and Declinations 
vis-à-vis Answers. The high accuracy rate across actions 
shows that participants go beyond a simple characterization 
of the target sentences as responses and “get” the correct 
action. Participants were also very confident in categorizing 
all actions and rated the certainty of their categorizations on 
average 6.48 (out of 7). These results provide further 
support that participants orient to the action content of 
sentences.3 
The reading time results demonstrate that the exact same 
sentence is processed differently depending on the speech 
act it performs. In all conditions the reading time increased 
throughout the sentence, but Declinations and Pre-Offers 
had different trajectories relative to Answers, which had 
shortest RTs on all measures. Reading times differed 
already at the first word, with first word RTs in Pre-Offers 
being longer than in both Answers and Declinations. It 
should be pointed out that descriptively the difference 
between the means is small and standard deviation large. 
Event-related brain potentials might be a more sensitive 
measure to reveal processing differences at early positions 
in the sentence. At the verb and the final word however, 
RTs were longest in the Declination condition. 
What could explain the different reading times across 
conditions? One possible source of difference is the amount 
of inferencing required. In text processing, reading times are 
predicted to be the longest for words in the text that generate 
“many online inferences” (Graesser, Swamer, & Baggett, 
1996). The fact that Declinations have the longest RTs at the 
final word may be because more inferences (e.g. Gricean 
implicatures) are needed to relate the sentence to the prior 
context.  
Another source for differences may be the kind of 
inferencing required. Given the exploratory nature of this 
study we did not make predictions regarding reading time 
results. However, based on differences in sequence 
organization, we speculated that Declinations and Pre-
Offers would exhibit different reading time patterns relative 
to Answers. While recognizing the speech act in a 
Declination requires computation of how the utterance can 
be understood as the second pair part to the prior proposal, 
identifying a Pre-Offer involves knowing that an offer will 
follow in the sequence. Because Declinations close an 
adjacency pair, they do not heavily constrain the relevant 
next action. Pre-Offers, on the other hand, call for either go-
                                                          
3 Note that the certainty ratings were lower for Pre-offers (6.35) 
than Answers (6.60) and Declinations (6.50). Since “pre-offer” is 
not a colloquial term, participants were instructed to categorize 
Pre-offers as “offering”. The ratings may reflect participants’ 
awareness that the speech acts they were instructed to label as 
“offering” are preparatory to, or project, offers and in most cases 
do not constitute offers in themselves. However, for the purpose of 
this study it was sufficient that participants could identify speech 
acts as belonging to one of the defined categories.  
ahead (e.g. you do?) and a subsequent offer, or a blocking 
response (that’s ok). Pre-Offers, therefore, invite stronger 
predictive inferences about the next speech act. The 
distinction between an inference based on a backward 
bridge to the prior turn in an adjacency pair and an inference 
based on forward projection of a sequence is akin to the 
difference between causal antecedent and causal 
consequence inferences in text processing (e.g. Magliano, 
Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993). The reading time 
differences between Pre-Offers and Declinations provide 
some indication that the distinction between forward 
projection and a backward directed inference plays a role in 
the online processing of speech acts. Why the projective 
nature of Pre-Offers would call for more processing at the 
first word, however, is less clear. More research is needed to 
investigate whether this finding holds for spoken language 
processing as well. 
Considering that action comprehension is crucial for 
everyday conversation, it seems likely that people can 
predict upcoming speech acts, making the fast transitions 
between turns (Sacks et al., 1974; Stivers et al., 2009; 
Levinson, in press) possible. Neuroimaging studies suggest 
that people use their knowledge of the wider discourse 
context to predict specific upcoming words and that 
prediction is not the result of relatively low-level, word-
based priming mechanisms, “but involves a more 
sophisticated message-level mechanism that can take into 
account the actual nuances of the preceding discourse,” 
(Otten & Van Berkum, 2008). Whether and how sequential 
context and the implicit knowledge of the organization of 
actions guides the interpretation of utterances is a topic for 
further investigation. We will explore this in future research 
using event-related brain potentials. 
An alternative explanation for the reading time results is 
that the experimental manipulation does not address speech 
act recognition per se, but some other confounding variable 
such as semantic priming from the context. Latent Semantic 
Analysis can be used to determine semantic relatedness of 
two texts and LSA similarity relations have been found to 
correspond well with the pattern of results in priming 
studies (Landauer et al., 1998). If semantic priming from the 
context is the main factor governing the reading times one 
would expect the condition with the lowest LSA values 
(least amount of priming) to have the longest mean reading 
times. The opposite is true: Answers had the lowest average 
LSA value but the shortest reading times on all measures. 
This suggests that the differences in reading times across 
conditions in our study were not due to lexico-semantic 
relationships between the content words of the context and 
the target sentences.  
Conclusion 
In this study on speech act comprehension we investigated 
the processing of sentences that perform different speech 
acts depending on prior context. In each case an assertion is 
used as a vehicle for some other action, and it is “part of 
competent membership in the society/culture and being a 
1600
competent interactant to analyze assertions of this sort for 
what (else) they may be doing at this moment, at this 
juncture of the interaction, in this specific sequential 
context” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 35). Our study tapped into this 
competence by addressing two primary questions: how 
reliably participants can categorize action-underspecific 
speech acts, and whether the time-course of speech act 
inferencing differs for the actions as reflected in self-paced 
reading times. 
Participants in our study categorized the speech acts of 
action-underspecified utterances with very high accuracy, 
based on limited context and without any prosodic 
information. Furthermore, the exact same sentence was 
processed differently depending on the speech act it 
performed, with reading times starting to differ already at 
the first word. These findings open up a new arena for 
experimental research on speech act recognition in 
conversation.  
As a crucial component of social behavior, 
communication involves actions. Being a competent 
member of society must require a cognitive architecture that 
is oriented to speech acts. However, given that the form and 
content of utterances is frequently underspecified for this 
level of meaning, assigning speech acts to our interlocutors 
is not a trivial matter. Having demonstrated that participants 
orient to the action content of sentences and can categorize 
speech acts with high accuracy, the next experimental step 
is to shed light on this ability in spoken dialogues – the 
foundation of doing things with words. 
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